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Immigration
by Charles H. Kuck*
and Keith N. Jensen"
During the January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015 survey period, the
Eleventh Circuit courts decided hundreds of cases affecting immigration
law. The following is a discussion of some of those decisions that
clarified important issues pertaining to immigration law in the Eleventh
Circuit.
I.

SUBJECT MATVITER JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION CASES

In Indrawati v. United States Attorney General,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the jurisdictional
requirements for its review of immigration cases, holding that the
appellant did not exhaust her administrative remedies, resulting in the
dismissal of two of her three claims brought on appeal.' The Eleventh
Circuit held that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review a final
order in an immigration case, unless the petitioner has exhausted all
available administrative remedies.' The court summarized that this
requires the petitioner to have presented the issue on appeal before the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) with sufficient factual and legal

* Managing Partner, Kuck Immigration Partners LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Adjunct
Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Brigham Young University (B.A., 1986);
Arizona State University Law School (J.D., 1989). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate, Kuck Immigration Partners LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Brigham Young
University (B.A., 2010); Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law (J.D.,
2015).
1. 779 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2015).
2. Id. at 1289.
3. Id. at 1297. "We lack jurisdiction to review final orders in immigration cases unless
'the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.' A
petitioner fails to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to a particular claim
when she does not raise that claim before the [Board of Immigration Appeals]." Id.
(citations omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2012)).
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discussion to enable a legitimate review of the immigration judge's
holding.4 This serves two purposes: (1) it prevents interference with
administrative procedure and (2) it ensures the administrative agency,
charged with review of the issue, is not avoided in its responsibility to
review the issue on appeal prior to an appellate decision.'
The Eleventh Circuit denied review of Indrawati's claims that she was
denied both a sufficient opportunity to address the discrepancies
between her asylum application and testimony before the immigration
court and that she was denied due process by the immigration court's
admission of a memorandum drafted by the Texas Service Center, which
was based upon an interview conducted with Indrawati's mother that
contradicted her asylum claim.6 The court reasoned that Indrawati
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not addressing either
of these arguments in her appellate brief submitted to the BIA.' Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked the requisite subject matter
jurisdiction to resolve those two issues on appeal."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
applied this same standard to a petitioner who filed an action for a writ
of habeas corpus while he was detained in Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) custody. The district court in Thomas v. ICE,9
refused to consider petitioner's claim that his ICE detainer should be
terminated because he should be released into treatment at a halfway
house, rather than detained by ICE, which negatively impacted his
public safety factor and resulted in a longer sentence.o The magistrate
judge dismissed the claim, finding that the petitioner had not exhausted
his administrative remedies and thus the court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction."
Further, the petitioner argued that he was eligible for United States
citizenship through his status as a stepchild of a United States citizen
prior to turning eighteen. 2 The court also dismissed this claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction as the petitioner had not exhausted his
administrative remedies." Here, the petitioner filed the appropriate
application with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1297-99.
Id. at 1297, 1299.
Id. at 1297.
No. 5:13-cv-126, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114784 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2015).
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *1, *7, *12-13.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *12-13.
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(USCIS), Form N-600.
However, that application had not yet been
adjudicated, and thus the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to review the pending application prior to an initial adjudicatory decision
and subsequent administrative appellate processes for review."

II.

REASONABLE CONSIDERATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Indrawati also clarified the degree
to which the BIA is required to review decisions on appeal.6 The
Eleventh Circuit cited Indrawati in a recent unpublished opinion,
stating,
In making this assessment, the agency shall consider "all evidence
relevant to the possibility of future torture." However, each claim or
piece of evidence presented by the petitioner need not be specifically
addressed-a decision-maker may omit discussion of some evidence and
still give reasoned consideration. We will remand only when the
decision was so lacking in reasoned consideration that review becomes
impossible."
III. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA HOLDS ADMINISTRATION OF INVOLUNTARY NUTRITION CONSTITUTIONAL
In Department of Homeland Security, Immigration &

Customs

Enforcement v. Ayvazian,1 9 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida granted an emergency court order granting
permission to administer involuntary nutrition to three noncitizens in
ICE detention. 20 There, three noncitizens started a hunger strike to
protest their detention. 2 ' A medical official for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) testified that due to the hunger strike, ICE
had three available options: (1) let the protesting individuals die, (2)
administer involuntary nutrition, or (3) end the detention of the three

individuals participating in the hunger strike.2 2 The court found the

14.
15.
16.
17.
Jan. 7,
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at *10.
Id. at *10-11.
See Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1298.
Camelien v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 15-10239, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 109(11th Cir.
2016) (citations omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2015)).
Id. at *7.
No. 15-23213-Civ-Scola; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121363 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2015).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *12.
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first and third options unreasonable and approved the motion to
administer involuntary nutrition to the detainees."
IV.

CLASSIFICATION OF AGGRAVATED FELONIES AND
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE

In Walker v. United States Attorney General,24 the Eleventh Circuit
held that operating a "chop shop" is an aggravated felony offense and in
the alternative that it is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under
the categorical approach.2 5 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 26 an alien who commits an aggravated felony is removable.27
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)," a noncitizen who commits more
than two crimes involving moral turpitude is removable. 29 A noncitizen
who admits committing a CIMT or who admits committing acts that
constitute the essential elements of a CIMT is inadmissible."o The
Florida statute at issue specifically provides the following: "Whoever
utters and publishes as true a false, forged or altered record, deed,
instrument or other writing . . . knowing the same to be false, altered,

forged or counterfeited, with intent to injure or defraud any person, shall
be guilty of a felony of the third degree. . . .""
The Eleventh Circuit held the offense at issue requires deceit, as the
offender knowingly makes a false representation regardless of the
specific intent required under the statute. An aggravated felony theft
offense is defined as "a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)
or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year." 3 The United States Supreme Court held that the term "theft
offense" in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) 34 referred to the generic definition
of theft: "taking of property or [exercising] control over property without
consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and
benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or

23. Id. at *12-13.
24. 783 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015).
25. Id. at 1229.
26. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
29. Id.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(i)(I) (2012).
31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 831.02 (West 2006).
32. Walker, 783 F.3d at 1228-29.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).
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permanent."" Both the BIA and the lower courts interpreted the theft
provision in the same manner, finding that "a taking of property
constitutes a 'theft' whenever there is criminal intent to deprive the
owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation
is less than total or permanent.", 6 Here, the Eleventh Circuit held the
offense of uttering a forged instrument requires a level of deceit,
justifying the classification as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(G).x
Applying the categorical approach adopted from Fajardo v. United
States Attorney General," the Eleventh Circuit held, under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(2)(A)(i)(I)," the offense of uttering a forged instrument is a
CIMT.40 A CIMT refers generally to the following:
[Clonduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to
the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or
to society in general .

.

..

Moral turpitude has been defined as an act

'

which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong, or
malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory
prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude. 4
Crimes involving moral turpitude involve reprehensible conduct that is
committed intentionally or with some other form of scienter, be it
specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness.42 Whether a
crime involves moral turpitude "depends upon the inherent nature of the
offense, as defined in the relevant statute, rather than the circumstances
surrounding a defendant's particular conduct."43
Here, the Eleventh Circuit simply held that because the crime of
uttering a forged instrument "involves deceit," it qualifies as a CIMT and
a "behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves
dishonest or fraudulent activity. 44 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that,
at the very least, knowingly aiding and abetting the operation to conceal

35. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189 (2007) (quoting Penuliar v.
Gonzales, 435 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)).
36. In re V-Z-S-, 2000 BIA LEXIS 13, at *19-20 (B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2000).
37. Walker, 783 F.3d at 1228-29.
38. 659 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2011).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(2)(A)(i)(1) (2013).
40. Walker, 783 F.3d at 1228-29; see also Fajardo, 659 F.3d at 1305.
41. In re Franklin, 1994 BIA LEXIS 15, at *3 (B.I.A. Sept. 3, 1994).
42. See id.
43. Sosa-Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 420 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002)).
44. Walker, 783 F.3d at 1229 (quoting Itani, 298 F.3d at 1216).
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or house parts amounts to deceit and dishonesty sufficient to justify the
classification of CIMT.4 5
Comparatively, an immigration judge in Atlanta found that a
respondent who had been convicted twice for shoplifting under section
16-8-14 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 46 was not
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
In the unpublished
decision, the judge held that DHS did not meet its burden to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable."' The
judge applied the categorical approach under Fajardo,finding that the
offense of shoplifting under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14 does not require the same
intent to deceive required for a CIMT.49 Specifically, in Georgia,
A person commits the offense of theft by shoplifting when he alone or
in concert with another person, with the intent of appropriating
merchandise to his own use without paying for the same or to deprive
the owner of possession thereof or of the value thereof, in whole or in
part ... Conceals or takes possession of the goods or merchandise of
any store or retail establishment."
The court determined that because one could be convicted of the offense
without the intent to permanently deprive another of possession, this
offense does not amount to the level of a CIMT, and the respondent was
not removable on these grounds."

V. ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DISMISSES CHALLENGE TO
DHS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE 2012 H-2B REGULATIONS
FOR LACK OF STANDING
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed a claim in which the petitioners
challenged the authority of the Department of Labor (DOL) to promulgate H-2B regulations.5 2
The H-2B nonimmigrant visa program
permits employers to hire foreign workers to come temporarily to the
United States and perform temporary nonagricultural services or labor

45. Id. at 1227, 1228-29.
46. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14 (2011 & Supp. 2015).
47. Order of the Immigration Judge, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
availabe at www.ga-al.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/GA-shoplifting-not-CIMT.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2016) (providing a heavily redacted copy of an immigration court order).
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Fajardo,659 F.3d at 1305.
50. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14(a)(1).
51. Order of the Immigration Judge, supra note 47.
52. Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. Sec'y, United States DOL, 621 F. App'x 620,
621 (11th Cir. 2015).
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on a one-time, seasonal, peakload, or intermittent basis." In February
2012, the DOL issued regulations altering the H-2B nonimmigrant visa
program, specifically limiting when and how employers could hire
foreign workers under the program.
Initially, the district court found
that the DOL did not have the authority to promulgate the regulations
at issue; rather, the authority was properly held by the DHS."
However, in early 2015, DOL and DHS jointly filed new H-2B regulations, which superseded the regulations at issue, making this particular
suit moot. 5 6 Thus, the court dismissed the action for lack of standing."

53. H-2B Certificationfor Temporary Non-Agricultural Work, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
(Oct. 22, 2009) https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/h-2b.cfm.
54. Bayou Lawn & Landscape Servs., 621 F. App'x at 621.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.

